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This paper argues that Hyman Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis weaves together 
a medium term Keynesian approach to the business cycles in the spirit of Samuelson 
(1936) and Hicks (1950) with long cycle thinking of economists such as Schumpeter 
(1939) and Kondratieff.  Post Keynesians have devoted considerable attention to the 
medium term dimension of Minsky’s thinking. The current paper concentrates on the 
long swing dimension and introduces the idea of “Minsky super-cycles.” It is the super-
cycle that ultimately permits financial crisis. Whereas financially driven business cycles 
occur every decade, financial crises occur over longer durations reflecting the longer 
phase of the super-cycle. 
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  The current economic crisis has been widely viewed as vindicating the work and 
insights of the late Hyman Minsky. This vindication was celebrated on the front page of 
the Wall Street Journal (August 18, 2007) at the very beginning of the crisis in an article 
titled “In Time of Tumult, Obscure Economist Gains Currency. Mr. Minsky Long 
Argued Markets Were Crisis Prone; His Moment has Arrived.” 
  This paper seeks to explore and extend the work of Hyman Minsky by surfacing 
ideas and themes that are clearly present in Minsky’s work but have not been given 
enough attention by economists, including those (almost exclusively Post Keynesians) 
who have recognized his contribution. While there have been many attempts to formalize 
his work, those attempts tend to treat Minsky as a narrow theorist of the financial 
business cycle rather than a process theorist of financial capitalism.  
  This paper argues that Minsky needs to be understood not only through a 
conventional medium-term business cycle lens, but also through the lens of long term 
swings. Minsky’s schema embodies both types of dynamic. In a sense, his financial 
instability hypothesis can be interpreted as weaving together the medium term Keynesian 
dynamic embodied in the Samuelson (1936) – Hicks (1950) approach to the business 
cycle with the long cycle thinking of economists such as Schumpeter (1939) and 
Kondratieff.  
  Post Keynesians have devoted considerable attention to the medium term 
dimension of Minsky’s thinking that operates through his stages of financing (Hedge – 
Speculative – Ponzi) schema. The current paper concentrates on the long swing 3 
 
dimension implicit in Minsky’s thinking and relates that long swing process to the 
conventional medium term business cycle. These long term swings are termed “Minsky 
super-cycles” and it is the super-cycle that ultimately permits financial crisis. Whereas 
financially driven business cycles occur every decade, financial crises occur over longer 
durations reflecting the longer phase of the super-cycle.
1 
II Minsky as process theorist 
  The foundation of Minsky’s thinking is his construction of the economic process. 
That makes Minsky a theorist of capitalism who theorized it in terms of “process”. This 
approach to economics put him at odds with modern economics that constructs capitalism 
in terms of “equilibrium” and it helps explain why Minsky was over-looked by much of 
the economics profession. 
  The equilibrium approach looks at the economic problem as one of establishing 
efficient market allocations. To the extent dynamics enter, it is with regard to whether 
those equilibrium allocations are stable or unstable. Viewed from the equilibrium 
perspective, process issues (i.e. dynamics) take a backseat and are an add-on to the 
economic problem. 
  For Minsky, process is the issue and his theory of process can be summarized as: 
“Success breeds excess breeds failure.” Such a construction of the economic process is 
one of evolutionary instability. Evolutionary factors are present because the economy 
evolves through stages that breed successive stages. Instability is present because the 
                                                            
1 The theoretical view developed in this paper complements Wray’s (2008) case study analysis of the 
current financial crisis, the seeds of which he traces back to the early 1970s and before.  4 
 
system periodically ends in failure and collapse, which is why Minsky termed his 
approach the financial instability hypothesis.  
  Minsky’s construction of the capitalist economic process recognizes features that 
are both general and historically specific. The generality of the “success breeds excess 
breeds failure” process is captured in Minsky’s view that “The more things change, the 
more they remain the same (Minsky, 1993, p.2).” The historical specificity is captured by 
his accompanying view “One can never step in the same stream twice (Minsky, 1993, 
p.2).” 
  The current financial crisis fits the schema. Its specific details are different from 
past financial crises but its underlying logic and evolution are structurally similar. 
Financial capitalism is governed by a general process that is enduring, but the landscape 
through which the process travels is forever changing and therefore historically specific. 
III Minsky as cycle theorist 
  Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis can be thought of as resting on two 
different cyclical processes, as illustrated in Figure 1. The first process is labeled the 
“basic Minsky cycle”, while the second process is labeled the “super-Minsky cycle”. The 
basic cycle is widely recognized and rests on the evolution of financing arrangements 
through successive stages of hedge, speculative, and Ponzi finance. The super-Minsky 
cycle is less well recognized, though it is fully articulated in a paper co-authored with 
Piero Ferri (Ferri and Minsky, 1992) that deserves far greater recognition. Unfortunately, 
the critical arguments in that paper were omitted in Minsky’s (1992) brief article titled 
“The Financial Instability Hypothesis” in which he summarized his theory. 5 
 
----------------- 
Figure 1 here 
----------------- 
 
  The basic cycle captures the phenomenon of emerging financial fragility as 
reflected in agents’ balance sheets and financing arrangements.
2 The basic cycle is 
illustrated in Figure 2 and it involves the familiar process of evolution beginning with 
hedge finance, passing through speculative finance, and ending with Ponzi finance. The 
basic cycle operates at the level of the individual enterprise. 
----------------- 
Figure 2 here 
----------------- 
 
  Much has been written on the basic cycle, and Minsky (1992) carefully defined its 
stages. “Hedge finance units are those which can fulfill all of their contractual payment 
obligations by their cash flows (Minsky, 1992, p.7)”, and it tends to be associated with 
greater weight of equity financing in the liability structure. “Speculative finance units are 
units that can meet their payment commitments on “income account” on their liabilities, 
even as they cannot repay the principle out of cash flows. Such units need to “roll over” 
their liabilities (Minsky, 1992, p.7).” Lastly, “for Ponzi units, the cash flows from 
operations are not sufficient to fulfill either the repayment of principle or the interest due 
on utstanding debts by their cash flows from operations. Such units can sell assets or 
borrow (Minsky, 1992, p.7).” 
  There are many formal models of the basic Minsky cycle. These include (to list a 
few) Foley (1987), Semmler and Franke (1991), Gallegati and Gardini (1991), Skott 
                                                            
2 For Minsky, these agents were business as he gave little attention to household borrowing. 6 
 
(1994), and Delli Gatti et al. (1994). All of these models emphasize the emergence of 
gradually more fragile corporate balance sheets that are marked by either reduced 
liquidity or higher debt-equity ratios. These developments give rise to balance sheet 
congestion that eventually strangles investment activity. This triggers an economic 
downturn that generates a de-leveraging process which eventually creates the conditions 
for another upswing. Palley (1994, 1997a) presents a model that focuses on households 
and consumer debt, and in that model it is the growing burden of debt service payments 
from free-spending debtor households to thriftier creditor households that eventually 
curtails the expansion. 
  Minsky’s theory of the basic cycle involves important psychological influences. 
The move between financing stages is in part driven by agents becoming progressively 
more optimistic, and that optimism manifests itself in increasingly optimistic valuations 
of assets and assessments of revenue streams, combined with increased willingness to 
take on more risk in the belief that good times are here forever. This optimistic 
psychology afflicts both borrowers and lenders, and not just one side of the market. That 
is critical because it means market discipline is removed. 
  Historically, long business cycles have tended to generate talk of the “death of the 
business cycle.” In the 1990s there was talk of the “new economy” that was supposed to 
have killed the business cycle by inaugurating a period of permanently accelerated 
productivity growth. The 2000s saw talk of the “Great Moderation” whereby central 
banks had tamed the business cycle through improved monetary policy based on 
improved theoretical understanding of the economy. This talk is not incidental. Instead, it 7 
 
constitutes broad evidence of the basic Minsky cycle at work. Improving times generate 
increased optimism, and that optimism afflicts all including regulators and policymakers. 
For instance, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke (2004) declared himself a believer 
in the Great Moderation hypothesis. 
  The basic Minsky cycle is present in every business cycle and operates at the 
enterprise level. However, it is complemented by the super-Minsky cycle that works over 
a period of several business cycles and operates at the system level. The super cycle is a 
process of transforming business institutions, business conventions, and structures 
governing the market. These structures are critical for ensuring stability of capitalist 
economies and Minsky (Ferri and Minsky, 1992) called them “thwarting institutions” in 
that they thwarted instability. 
  The process of erosion and transformation takes several cycles, which is why the 
super-cycle is a long phase cycle whereas the basic cycle is a shorter phase cycle. 
However, both cycles take place simultaneously. Figure 3 illustrates the stages of the 
super-Minsky cycle. Full-blown financial busts that threaten the survivability of the 
economy only happen “once a generation” when the super-Minsky cycle has had time to 
erode the economy’s thwarting institutions. In between these busts only the basic Minsky 
cycle is visible. 
----------------- 
Figure 3 here 
----------------- 
 
  The super-Minsky cycle works over a period of several basic Minsky cycles. This 
pattern of development is illustrated in Figure 4, which shows a gradually evolving cycle 8 
 
characterized by potential for greater amplitude. This evolving amplitude is accompanied 
by weakening of thwarting institutions which is represented by the widening and thinning 
of the bands determining the system’s floors and ceilings. Eventually the thwarting 
institutions become sufficiently eroded and the embrace of financial excess is sufficiently 
deep that the economy experiences an uncontained cyclical bust.
3 Once a full scale bust 
occurs the economy enters a period of renewal of thwarting institutions – which 
reasonably describes the current period (2009) when there is talk of renewed regulation. 
----------------- 
Figure 4 here 
---------------- 
 
  Figure 4 shows the case where economy undergoes cycles of widening amplitude 
prior to the bust. However, there is no requirement for this. Instead, the economy may 
have cycles of roughly unchanged amplitude but the thwarting institutions gradually 
weaken until there eventually comes a time when they are unable to contain the cycle. 
This alternative case is shown in Figure 5. 
---------------- 
Figure 5 here 
---------------- 
  Analytically, the full Minsky system can be thought of as a combination of three 
different approaches to the business cycle. The basic dynamic rests on Samuelson’s 
(1936) multiplier – accelerator representation of the business cycle. The thwarting 
institutions involve floors and ceilings and link Minsky’s thinking to Hicks’ (1950) 
                                                            
3 Keynesian stabilization policies are themselves a thwarting institution. Ironically, by helping stabilize the 
economy, these policies can obscure the emergence of instability in other corners of the economy.  9 
 
construction of the trade cycle. The super-cycle aspect is then captured by shifting and 
weakening of floors and ceilings, which provides links to economists such Schumpeter 
(1939). The thwarting institutions are explicitly present in the floors and ceilings, but 
they may also be present in the coefficients of the multiplier - accelerator model which 
determine the responsiveness of economic activity to changes in such variables as 
expectations and asset prices. Minsky (see Delli Gatti et al., 1994) referred to all three 
types of cycle and his own early formal modeling (Minsky, 1957, 1959) made use of 
these modeling approaches.  
  However, the problem with formal modeling is it imposes too deterministic a 
phase length on what is in reality a historically idiosyncratic process. Adding stochastic 
disturbances jostles the process but does not adequately capture the idiosyncratic process 
Minsky described as “One never steps in the same stream twice”. Modeling, which is the 
modern economist’s obsession, may simply not be up to the task, and Minsky realized 
this; “A model per se, however, is nothing else than a device for organizing thoughts. 
When deemed necessary, our description of financial developments will be richer and 
more detailed than that incorporated into the model (Delli Gatti et al, 1994, p.4).”
4   
IV Details of the Minsky super-cycle 
  The super-Minsky cycle can be thought of as allowing more and more financial 
risk into the system. The cycle involves twin developments of “regulatory relaxation” and 
“increased risk taking” that is shown in Figure 6. The process of regulatory relaxation can 
                                                            
4 Models should be judged on the thought organizing and thought illumination criterion. The trouble is they 
are increasingly judged on whether they are a “mirror of reality”. Not only is the creation of such a mirror 
an impossible task, making it the criterion for modeling results in dismissing “thought organizing” 
modeling while simultaneously encouraging misguided “mirror of reality” modeling. This tendency has 
likely worked to keep Minsky’s ideas out of mainstream economics. 10 
 
be identified with increasing the supply of risk, while the process of increased risk taking 
can be identified with increases of both supply and demand for risk. 
----------------- 
Figure 6 here 
------------------ 
  The process of regulatory relaxation and increased supply of risk has three 
dimensions. The first is regulatory capture. Thwarting institutions limit the activities of 
financial institutions. If economically binding, these limitations reduce profits. That 
creates an economic incentive to capture regulatory agencies to weaken regulations. Such 
a process of capture has clearly been evident over past 25 years, and is now even 
acknowledged by mainstream economists (Johnson, 2009). Wall Street has stepped up its 
lobbying efforts and there is a revolving door between Wall Street on one side and 
government on the other – in particular the Federal Reserve, the Treasury, and the 
Securities Exchange Commission.  
  The second dimension is regulatory relapse. Regulators are human and part of 
society, and like investors (see below) are subject to memory loss and reinterpretation of 
history. Thus, regulators forget the lessons of the past and buy into the rhetoric of death 
of business cycle. The result is willingness to weaken regulation on grounds that things 
are changed and regulation no longer needed. This shift in policy may be supported by 
developments in economics driven by similar social forces, which provide an intellectual 
justification for such regulatory change.  
  The third dimension is regulatory escape. Thus, the supply of risk can increase 
through financial innovation that escapes the regulatory net because it was not conceived 
of when regulation was established. Innovation causes activity to spill outside the domain 11 
 
of thwarting institutions, and addressing innovation requires constant updating of 
regulation. However, the forces of regulatory capture and regulatory relaxation work 
against regulatory updating by challenging the will to maintain a comprehensive coherent 
system of regulation.  
  These considerations of regulatory relaxation raise two vital points. The first is 
that the process of regulatory relaxation is intimately connected to ideas and ideology. As 
ideas, ideology, and perceptions change, attitudes toward regulation (i.e. deregulation and 
the need for new regulation) will also change. That means the deep social forces driving 
ideas, ideology, and perception are part of the mechanism driving the Minsky super-
cycle. 
  The second important implication concerns regulatory policy. Effective regulation 
is a dynamic game played between market and regulator, and the market always seeks to 
escape regulation. If regulation is economically binding in the sense of limiting activities 
market participants would otherwise undertake, markets are likely to eventually innovate 
around the regulations. In effect, good regulation inevitably sows the seeds of own 
destruction by providing an incentive to innovate (Palley, 1998, p.7), and it is this 
microeconomic logic that lies behind the Minsky super-cycle. From a policy perspective, 
this means those who fatalistically claim regulation is useless because it will be avoided 
are entirely wrong. Good regulation sets up an incentive to avoid it, and regulation that 
does not do so is economically non-binding. The policy challenge is to make avoidance 
difficult and to update regulation once the market figures out how to avoid existing 12 
 
regulation. However, the proclivity to avoidance is not a valid argument against 
regulation. 
  The process of increased risk taking also involves three dimensions. The first is 
financial innovation that provides new products which allow more risk-taking. Over the 
past two decades the household sector has been introduced to home equity loans, lower 
mortgage down-payments, and a shift in pension arrangements from defined benefit plans 
to defined contribution plans where the ultimate payment depends on investments made.  
Financial markets have also created and expanded the use of a host of new products that 
facilitate financial risk-taking. These include securitization and tranching of securities, 
derivatives, and options. All of these products allow households, business, and financial 
institutions to take on new patterns and changed levels of financial risk.  
  A second dimension of increased risk-taking is memory loss and culture change 
that increases the demand for risk.
5 The passage of time contributes to forgetting of 
earlier financial crisis and that makes for a new willingness (taste for) to take on risk. The 
experience of the Great Depression permanently reduced the demand for equities among 
the 1930s generation, but baby boomers who never experienced the depression have been 
enthusiastic stock investors. 
  The phenomenon of memory loss is evident in the gradual decline and 
disappearance of the so-called “equity premium” – the excess return to stocks relative to 
                                                            
5 The changed in demand for risk resulting from memory loss, culture change, and data hysteresis link with 
Dequech’s (1999) description of decision making under uncertainty involving issues of “uncertainty 
aversion” and “uncertainty perception”, both of which are socially mutable. 13 
 
bonds. As preferences for stock investing have been re-built, that has driven up the price 
of stock and reduced its relative return.  
  Another related factor is culture change, which may rely on memory loss as one 
of it drivers. This phenomenon is evident in the development of a “greed is good” culture 
epitomized by fictional character Gordon Gecko in the movie, Wall Street. Similarly, 
investing has developed into a new form of entertainment and is reflected in phenomena 
like day trading and emergence of TV investment adviser personalities like Jim Cramer. 
Finally, culture change is evident in attitudes toward home ownership which is now as 
much interpreted as an investment opportunity as provision of a place to live. 
  The third and final dimension of increased risk taking is data hysteresis, which is 
an inevitable feature of Minsky’s view that the structure of the economy is continuously 
changing. That process of change inevitably generates data hysteresis. Crisis is followed 
by a period of rebuilding of risk thwarting institutions that reduces risks and changes the 
data outcomes the system generates. Thereafter, there follows a long period marked by an 
uneven process of regulatory capture, regulatory relapse, regulatory escape, financial 
innovation, memory loss, and culture change. These developments mean the data 
generating process is subject to continuous change so that time series analysis becomes a 
wholly inappropriate guide for action. However, that does not stop people using such 
analysis. 
  This problem is illustrated in Figure 7 that shows stylized risk return trade-offs. 
As appetite and opportunities for risk-taking increase because of memory loss, financial 
innovation, deregulation, etc., agents move up the risk-return schedule. However, they 14 
 
are blind to the fact that the schedule has shifted because of changed structural conditions 
– including increased risk-taking by all. Most importantly, this blindness applies on all 
sides of the market, including regulators, so that market discipline is an ineffective 
protection against the build-up of positions that ultimately generate crisis. 
------------------- 
Figure 7 here 
------------------- 
 
V Minsky’s broad intellectual appeal 
  Minsky’s thinking about the economic process has broad and wide appeal, 
making it attractive to many different schools of thought. The Minsky super-cycle 
describes the economy as passing through stages in which thwarting institutions are 
eroded and the process eventually ends in crisis.  
  This emphasis on institutions makes it consistent with institutionalist economics. 
The “stages plus crisis” framework also resonates with the social structures of 
accumulation (SSA) school articulated by neo-Marxists such as (see for instance Kotz et 
al., 1994). It also resonates with the French regulationist school (see for instance Boyer 
and Saillard, 2002) that sees capitalism as organized by different regimes of production.  
  Minsky is a natural complement to both SSA and regulationist. First, Minsky 
sharpens the focus on finance which until recently was relatively under-emphasized in 
SSA and regulationist thinking. Second, Minsky can be thought of as introducing a 
“double stage” approach that includes both long and short stages. Viewed in this light, 
regimes can be thought of as defining the long stage. Within that long stage, regimes 15 
 
undergo short stages of evolution (success breeds excess breeds failure), and these short 
stages eventually end in crisis that becomes the occasion for creation of a new regime.
6 
  Minsky’s construction of the emergence of different of stages of the cycle also fits 
neatly with an evolutionary approach to economics. Additionally, the role of changing 
psychology and expectations in driving the shift from hedge to speculative to Ponzi 
finance links Minsky to the new field of behavioral economics in which psychological 
factors and biases play a critical role. 
  Furthermore, the Minsky super-cycle is also consistent with the concept of 
hysterisis that has been emphasized by Post Keynesians (see Setterfield, 1997a, 1997b). 
For Minsky, history is a one way train and experience changes beliefs, understandings 
and priors in a way that cannot be reversed. Thus, the process of memory loss regarding 
prior crises is fundamentally hysteretic. So too is the changing pattern of data that results 
from changing behavior and changes in the institutional structure. This emphasis on 
history and the connection to hysteresis also connects with the ergodic – non-ergodic 
distinction that has been raised by Davidson (1991) and which challenges the legitimacy 
of using probability theory to describe the likelihood of realizing different states of the 
world.  
VI Minsky and the new Keynesians 
  Minsky was an avowed Keynesian and his approach is consistent with Keynesian 
economics that takes as its point of intellectual departure that capitalist economies are 
                                                            
6 Crisis is different from a deep recession. Crisis is a situation in which a regime is so beset by its internal 
contradictions that it can no longer function in a politically and socially acceptable fashion, and that failure 
brings forth need for a new regime. A new regime may emerge quickly and smoothly, or it may only 
emerge after an extended period of conflict, stagnation, and instability.  16 
 
susceptible to crisis and are not automatically self-adjusting. New Keynesians (Bernanke 
et al., 1996, 1999; Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997) have also tried to incorporate Minsky’s 
thinking into their models through the notion of a financial accelerator. The logic is 
changes in asset prices increase the value of collateral enabling increased borrowing that 
raises debt and ultimately gives rise to balance sheet congestion that causes a downturn. 
  The new Keynesian financial accelerator succeeds in creating a financially driven 
business cycle but it is fundamentally different from Minsky’s financial instability 
hypothesis. That is because New Keynesian models are philosophically inconsistent with 
Minsky. Whereas Minsky’s approach is one of evolutionary instability, the new 
Keynesian approach is one of stable equilibrium, which by definition cannot incorporate 
the financial instability hypothesis.  
  Evolutionary models are inevitably open-ended in the sense that agents do not 
know where they are going until they end up there. In contrast, equilibrium models are 
closed and agents know where they are going to end up. Agent based equilibrium models 
therefore preclude incorporating the evolutionary aspect of Minsky’s thinking. 
  Likewise, instability is not possible in new Keynesian models with rational agents 
who form expectations that peer into the future. These agents would recognize the 
economy is headed on an unstable path, and immediately bring those implications to the 
present forcing in place alternative stable arrangements.
7 In the new Keynesian model the 
structure of the world is known and future outcomes can be predicted subject to the 
                                                            
7 An alternative resolution is that of jumping to the stable saddle path solution. That trick is implausible in 
terms of what people in the real world understand about the economy, and it also does nothing to address 
the fundamental issue which is about the character of the economic process.  17 
 
caveat of white noise disturbances. This new Keynesian construction of the economic 
process fundamentally contradicts Minsky’s construction which is about the gradual 
evolution of instability that agents are blind too yet is inherent in their behaviors. This is 
not a matter of irrationality or bounded rationality. In Minsky’s world agents can be 
completely rational but their actions cause the economy to evolve in a way that 
predictably tends to instability, but agents do not recognize this.  
  The implication is that the neo-classical agent based rational expectations 
modeling methodology that now dominates macroeconomics is methodologically 
incapable of representing Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis. This is because neo-
classical methodology has in mind a different construction of the economic process – one 
that is stable and fixed. Cycles can be generated by adding mechanisms like the financial 
accelerator, but Minsky is about more than cycles. Likewise instability can be created by 
adding stochastic disturbances – “shocks” – but that completely misrepresents Minsky’s 
instability which is rooted in evolutionary process. In the neo-classical world crises can 
only occur because of shocks: hence the emphasis on fat tailed probability distributions, 
perfect storms, black swans and other metaphors of chance. That is a fundamentally 
different construction of crisis from that contained in Minsky’s financial instability 
hypothesis.  
  Square pegs cannot fit in round holes. Minsky is an intellectual square peg. Neo-
classical rational expectations macroeconomics is an intellectual round hole. If the 
current financial crisis is indeed a vindication of Minsky’s view of capitalism, then it 18 
 
means that neo-classical rational expectations construction of macroeconomics is 
fundamentally flawed as a description of capitalism. 
VII The Minsky process as post-modernist meta-process 
  Section II described Minsky as a process theorist. The Minskyian construction of 
the economic process in terms of “success breeds success breeds failure” can be applied 
more widely than just the financial business cycle.  
  For instance, one application might be to popular understandings of unions and 
their economic effects. In the period after the great Depression trade unions were seen as 
a necessary institution for correcting excessive income inequality generated by the 
market and which threatened to undermine the system. Over time, as unions succeeded in 
bringing down income inequality people may have begun to believe that the problem of 
income inequality was permanently solved so that unions were no longer needed. 
Consequently, public support for unions may have declined, causing unions to shrink, 
and the problem of income distribution to return. 
  A similar logic can be made regarding the economics of Keynes and Keynesian 
economic policies. After World War II, Keynesian economics emerged triumphant, with 
the New Deal and the war having shown how demand management could restore full 
employment. This triumph was followed by a twenty-five year period in which the 
economy experienced historically fast growth, stable conditions, and low unemployment. 
However, that success may have led people to believe that the economic problem was 
permanently solved and to forget the history behind this success. This memory loss may 
in turn have contributed to the retreat from Keynesianism and fostered the return of 19 
 
laissez-faire understandings and economic policy.
8 In effect, Keynesian success at taming 
the economy helped create the space for re-birth of instability. 
  The financial instability hypothesis and the evolution of attitudes about unions 
and thinking about Keynesianism all embed a common Minskyian meta-process whereby 
initial success causes changes that in turn undermine the initial success. In many regards 
that meta-process is a fundamentally post-modern construction. People’s understanding 
of the economy evolves through time and people are involved in the making of the 
outcomes that change their understandings. At the same time their initial understanding 
contributed to those outcomes. Thus there is a feedback loop that runs as follows: initial 
understandings Æ outcomes Æ new understandings 
  This feedback loop is fundamentally reflexive. It is central to the Minsky super-
cycle, and it has also been emphasized by the financier George Soros (1987). It means 
that the world is forever in flux and evolving, which is the opposite of an equilibrium 
construction of the world. 
  A second feature of a post-modernist perspective is that it is impossible to stand 
outside of society and the economy to establish an objective detachment. This explains 
why it is so difficult to recognize the Minsky super-cycle while it is taking place - “under 
our noses” so to speak. When the boom is on borrowers, lenders, regulators, and 
                                                            
8 The return of laissez faire thinking was also likely encouraged by the Cold war which placed the ideology 
of free markets in conflict with the ideology of central planning. As part of winning the debate over 




policymakers get caught up in its optimism. So too do economists. That is why market 
discipline fails, and it is also why regulation is prone to failure 
  Even more importantly, everyone – including economists – gets caught up in the 
long-wave social and political developments that contribute to driving the super-cycle. 
Thus, when society moves to the left and becomes more favorable toward policies of 
regulation, economists will also tend to move to the left. When society moves to the right 
in a direction favoring deregulation and laissez-faire, economists will also tend to move 
in that direction.  
  Such a description of economists and economic knowledge is post-modern and at 
odds with the conventional view. That conventional view maintains economists stand 
outside of society as detached objective observers, as illustrated in Figure 7. A post-
modern view places economists in society, making them subjects that have subjective 
understandings (Palley, 1997b). This view is illustrated in Figure 8. This latter 
construction captures how the Minsky super-cycle embraces all, which explains why so 
many are carried away by the cumulative exuberance that gradually undermines the 
economy’s thwarting institutions. That makes it difficult for policy to guard against the 
super-cycle, and it also makes it difficult for economists to theorize (i.e. model) the 
super-cycle except as a generic process. 
----------------------- 
Figures 8 & 9 here 
----------------------- 
 
VIII Policy Implications 21 
 
  Hyman Minsky was first and foremost a theorist of the process of financial 
capitalism. However, his work also carries deep prescriptions for thinking about policy 
and policymaking. Those policy prescriptions run significantly counter to the 
prescriptions generated by new classical and new Keynesian macroeconomics which 
have dominated economics for past thirty years.  
Prescription 1: Policymakers should exercise self-conscious skepticism toward the 
euphoria that accompanies business cycle. Such euphoria is an inevitable product of the 
logic of the financial instability hypothesis. 
Prescription 2: Capitalist economies need significant regulation containing financial 
speculation and financial excess because the economy has an automatic behavioral 
tendency to instability. If Milton Friedman is the philosophical advocate of a deregulated 
economy, Hyman Minsky is the philosophical advocate of a regulated economy. For 
Friedman the case for deregulation is to be found in the first welfare theorem of 
competitive general equilibrium theory. For Minsky the case for regulation is to be found 
in the financial instability hypothesis. That justification is distinct from the conventional 
market failure justification for regulation which is rooted in competitive general 
equilibrium theory. 
Prescription 3: A Minskyian perspective emphasizes policy discretion over policy rules. 
Models, numbers, and rules are insufficient for policymaking. There is no substitute for 
judgment in policymaking because the economy is governed by an evolutionary dynamic 
that has an inevitable tendency toward instability. Rules based policy is unable to 
recognize and respond to this process. Instead, there is need for discretion combined with 22 
 
thwarting institutions.
9 Indeed, those thwarting institutions might be considered Minsky’s 
equivalent of rules. 
  In sum, Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis is a theory of economic process 
under financial capitalism. That process has an inevitable tendency to generate instability, 
through the combination of the basic Minsky cycle and the Minsky super-cycle. This 
means there is a key role for policy to thwart instability through the creation of 
“thwarting institution”. The challenge for policymakers is both to identify incipient 
sources of instability and to ward-off market participants whose private economic 
interests lead them to persistently evade, undermine, and advocate abolition of the 
thwarting institutions. That advocacy can take the form of direct capture of regulators, 
policymakers, and politicians, as well as indirect capture implemented through capture of 
economic discourse. 
                                                            
9 Davidson’s (1991) distinction between ergodic and non-ergodic processes provides a similar justification 
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Figure 5. An alternative description of the full 





Figure 6. Details of the super-Minsky cycle.
Super-Minsky Cycle





















Figure 8. The  conventional view of the 
relationship between economist and society. 
Source: Palley, 1997
Economist Society
Figure 9. The post-modernist view of the 
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